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Envisaging Constitutional Space
for Aboriginal Governments
Kent McNeil"
Wben the Supreme Court decided Sparrow, it could have interpreted s. 35 of the
Constitution to give Aboriginal peoples absolute power over Aboriginal and treaty
rights,a power which neither Parliamentnor the Provinces could trump. Instead, the
Court interpreteds. 35 to mean that Parliamentcould still infringe Aboriginalrights
if the infringement could be justified by a strict test. ProfessorMcNeil suggests that this
interpretation does not originate in the constitutional text so much as in the British
constitutionalconcepts ofParliamentarysovereignty and the rule of law. He argues that
the Court maintained Parliament'spower to regulate Aboriginal rights because it
combined these constitutional concepts with an assumption that these rights are not
effectively regulated by Aboriginal governments and laws. The Court's unarticulated
fear was that an intolerable legal vacuum would be createdif s. 35 was interpretedas
excluding all federal regulatorypower. The authorargues, however, that to decolonize
Canadianconstitutionallaw, we must redefine Parliamentarysovereignty and the rule
of law to include Aboriginalgovernments and laws, which could fill the constitutional
space that s. 35 provided and avoid the vacuum that the Courtfeared.

Introduction
I. Parliamentary Infringement of Section 35(1) Rights
Foundations of the Canadian Constitution
III. A Constitutional Space for Self-Government
II.

Conclusion

Introduction
The issue of Aboriginal self-government has moved from the
periphery of constitutional debate to centre stage over the past
twelve years. Prior to the patriation of the Canadian Constitution

* Valuable research assistance for this article was provided by Bernd Christmas,
Lana Finney, Alexandra Mouland, and Robert Freedman. I would also like to
thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for their
financial support of this work, and Professors Michael Asch, Bruce Ryder, and
Brian Slattery for very helpful comments and suggestions.
K. McNeil

in 1982, Aboriginal claims to a right of self-government generally
did not receive serious consideration. The Eurocentric vision of
two founding nations, and the constitutional dogma of exhaustive

division of legislative powers in our federal system, simply left no
place for Aboriginal governments in the minds of most nonAboriginal politicians and jurists.'
This began to change after the Constitution Act, 1982 was

enacted, providing Canada with substantive protection for
Aboriginal and treaty rights in s. 35:
35. (1) The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada
are hereby recognized and affirmed.
(2) In this Act, "aboriginal peoples of Canada" includes the Indian, Inuit and
Metis peoples of Canada.'

1. See discussion in Kent McNeil, "The Decolonization of Canada: Moving
Towards Recognition of Aboriginal Governments" [forthcoming].
2. An extensive body of literature on s. 35 has been produced since its enactment.
See e.g.: Kenneth M. Lysyk, "The Rights and Freedoms of the Aboriginal Peoples
of Canada (Ss. 25, 35 and 37)" in W. S. Tarnopolsky and G.-A. Beaudoin, eds., The
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Commentary (Toronto: Carswell, 1982)
467; Kent McNeil, "The Constitutional Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of
Canada" (1982) 4 Supreme Court L.R. 255 [hereinafter "Constitutional Rights of
the Aboriginal Peoples"], and "The Constitution Act, 1982, Sections 25 and 35"
[1988] 1 C.N.L.R. 1 [hereinafter "The Constitution Act, 1982"]; Douglas Sanders,
"The Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada" (1983) 61 Can. Bar Rev. 314,
and "Pre-Existing Rights: The Aboriginal Peoples of Canada (Sections 25 and 35)"
in G.-A. Beaudoin and E. Ratushney, eds., The Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms,2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1989) 707; Brian Slattery, "The Constitutional
Guarantee of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights" (1983) 8 Queen's Law Journal 232
[hereinafter "The Constitutional Guarantee"], "The Hidden Constitution:
Aboriginal Rights in Canada" (1984) 32 Am. J. Comp. L. 361 [hereinafter "The
Hidden Constitution"], "UnderstandingAboriginal Rights" (1987) 66 Can. Bar Rev.
727, and "First Nations and the Constitution: A Question of Trust" (1992) 71 Can.
Bar Rev. 261 [hereinafter "First Nations and the Constitution"]; Norman Zlotkin,
Unfinished Business: Aboriginal Peoples and the 1983 Constitutional Conference
(Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, 1983) at 37-46; Michael Asch,
Home and Native Land:AboriginalRights and the Canadian Constitution (Toronto:
Methuen, 1984) esp. at 1-8; James O'Reilly, "La Loi constitutionnelle de 1982:
Droits des autochtones" (1984) 25 C. de D. 125; Georges Emery, "R6flexions sur
le sens et laport~e au Quebec des articles 25, 35, et 37 de laLoi constitutionnelle
de 1982" (1984) 25 C. de D. 145; Peter W. Hogg, ConstitutionalLaw of Canada,3d
ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1992) at 687-693; Justin Malbon, "Section 35, Canadian
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The next year, the House of Commons Special Committee on
Indian Self-Government released its influential Penner Report,
recommending that "the right of Indian peoples to self-government
be explicitly stated and entrenched in the Constitution of

Canada.' 3 During the four constitutional conferences held from
1983 to 1987 to try to identify and define s. 35(1) rights, the issue

of constitutionally entrenching the right of self-government
dominated the agenda.4 While no agreement was reached, federal
and provincial leaders, and the public, were clearly informed that
the issue was important to the Aboriginal peoples. This lesson was
reinforced by the negative Aboriginal reaction to the Meech Lake
Accord, which accommodated the demands of Quebec while
ignoring Aboriginal aspirations to have the legitimacy of their
governments acknowledged in the Constitution.5

Constitution Act - The Aboriginal Right to Land" (LL.M. Thesis, Osgoode Hall
Law School, 1987); William Pentney, "The Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of
Canada in the Constitution Act, 1982: Part II - Section 35: The Substantive
Guarantee" (1988) 22 U.B.C. L. Rev. 207; Noel Lyon, "An Essay on Constitutional
Interpretation" (1988) 26 Osgoode Hall L.J. 95, and "A Perspective on the Application of the CriminalCode to Aboriginal Peoples in Light of the Judgment of the
Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Sparrow" (1992) Special Ed. U.B.C. L. Rev. 306;
Patrick Macklem, "Aboriginal Peoples, Criminal Justice Initiatives and the Constitution" (1992) Special Ed. U.B.C. L. Rev. 280. See also articles listed infra note 28.
3. Indian SelfGovernment in Canada:Report of the Special Committee (Ottawa:
Supply and Services Canada, 1983).
4. On these conferences, see: Norman K. Zlotkin, "The 1983 and 1984
Constitutional Conferences: Only the Beginning" [1984] 3 C.N.L.R. 3; Bryan
Schwartz, FirstPrinciples,Second Thoughts:AboriginalPeoples, ConstitutionalReform
and CanadianStatescrafit (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1986);
David C. Hawkes, AboriginalPeoples and ConstitutionalReform: What Have We
Learned? (Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, 1989); and Kathy L.
Brock, "The Politics of Aboriginal Self-Government: A Canadian Paradox" (1991)
34 Can. Pub. Admin. 272.
5. See: Louis Bruyere, "Aboriginal Peoples and the Meech Lake Accord" (1988) 5
Can. Hum. Rts. Y.B. 49; George Erasmus, "Twenty Years of Disappointed Hopes"
in B. Richardson, ed., Drumbeat:Anger and Renewal in Indian Country (Toronto:
Summerhill Press, 1989) 1 at 6-7 and 26-27; Geoffrey York, The Dispossessed: Life
and Death in Native Canada (London: Vintage U.K., 1990) at 272-275; and J.R.
Miller, Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens: A History ofIndian-White Relations in Canada,
rev. ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991) at 235.
K. McNeil

After the demise of the Meech Lake Accord, it was clear that
constitutional renewal in Canada could not succeed without the
participation of the Aboriginal peoples. The presence of the leaders
of the four national Aboriginal organizations6 at the negotiating
table with the first ministers was therefore essential during the
next round of talks. As everyone knows, those talks resulted in
the

Consensus Report on the Constitution, agreed

to

at

Charlottetown on August 28, 1992, by the leaders of the four
Aboriginal organizations, the first ministers, and the two
territorial leaders. The Charlottetown Accord would have led to
recognition in the Constitutionof the Aboriginal peoples' inherent
right of self-government within Canada, with arrangements for
implementation to be settled through further negotiations!
The defeat of the Charlottetown Accord in the Referendum of
October 26, 1992, seriously jeopardized the efforts to have
Aboriginal self-government explicitly recognized in the
Constitution.Although many people have said that the 'No' vote
should not be interpreted as a rejection of self-government,
political reality in the wake of the Referendum makes it unlikely
that express constitutional recognition of that right will be

6. These organizations were: the Assembly of First Nations, representing most
status Indians; the Native Council of Canada, representing mainly non-status
Indians and some Metis; the M6tis National Council, representing the Metis Nation
in the prairie provinces; and the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada, representing the Inuit.
Note, however, that some Aboriginal people claim not to be represented by any
of these organizations. During the latest round of constitutional talks, for example,
the Native Women's Association of Canada made this claim with respect to some
issues affecting Aboriginal women. See: Sean Fine, "Native women aim to block
national referendum in court" The[Toronto] Globe andMail (13 October 1992) A8;
Native Women's Association of Canadav. Canada, [1992] 4 C.N.L.R. 59 (F.C.T.D.),
[1992] 4 C.N.L.R. 71 (F.C.A.); Native Women's Association of Canada v. Canada
(1992), 57 F.T.R. 115 (F.C.T.D.), aff'd (1992), 145 N.R. 253 (F.C.A.). See also
Michael Doxtater, "Failing to reach the Indian people: What is the democratic base
of the Assembly of First Nations?" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (5 November
1992) A19.
7. The Accord's provisions relating to Aboriginal peoples are outlined and
discussed in McNeil, supra note 1 at 23-38.
19 Queen's Law Journal

achieved in the near future.' Other options exist, however. One
is to pursue self-government outside the constitutional context, an
approach which appears to be on the Aboriginal leaders' agendas.9
This approach could involve negotiated agreements with the
federal, and some provincial, governments." Agreements of this
sort, however, often involve delegated rather than inherent
authority, making them unacceptable to many Aboriginal
people." Moreover, unless included in land claims settlements,
self-government agreements may not be constitutionally protected."

8. Would a Quebec premier, for example, be likely to agree to the constitutional
aspirations of Aboriginal peoples without Quebec's own requirements being met?
Would British Columbia or Alberta agree without Senate reform? It may well be
that one reason the constitutional conferences on Aboriginal issues in the 1980s
failed was that the federal and provincial governments had little to gain: see Brock,
supra note 4 at 278. The Charlottetown Accord was made possible because it was a
compromise which gave something to everyone.
9. See Rudy Platiel and Geoffrey York, "Mercredi serves notice 'quiet revolution'
to begin" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (28 October 1992) A10; David Roberts,
"Metis demand talks on self-rule" The [Toronto]Globe and Mail (29 October 1992)
A4 (compare "Leader gets cool reception from Manitoba over bid to implement
Metis Nation Accord" Victoria Times-Colonist (29 October 1992) A6).
10. The federal government appears to support this approach: see Rudy Platiel,
"Powers shift to aboriginals, government says" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (20
November 1992) A7.
11. The Sechelt Indian model of self-government, for example, has been criticized
for this reason: see John P. Taylor and Gary Paget, "Federal/Provincial
Responsibility and the Sechelt" in David C. Hawkes, ed., Aboriginal Peoples and
GovernmentResponsibility:ExploringFederalandProvincialRoles (Ottawa: Carleton
University Press, 1989) 297 at 339-340.
12. If part of a land claims agreement, they are protected because s. 35(3) of the
ConstitutionAct, 1982, added by the ConstitutionalAmendment Proclamation,1983,
(see SI/84-102) provides that, "For greater certainty, in subsection (1) 'treaty rights'
includes rights that now exist by way of land claims agreements or may be so
acquired." It can be argued that self-government agreements that are not contained
in land claims agreements are treaties nonetheless, and as such are protected by
subsection (1). The addition of subsection (3) in 1983 probably makes this
argument less convincing, but support for it can be found in the principle of statutory interpretation that ambiguities - which certainly applies to the term "treaties"
in s. 35(1) - are to be interpreted in favour of the Aboriginal peoples. See:
Nowegijick v. Canada, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 29 at 36; Simon v. R., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 387 at
402; and R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 at 1107-1108 [hereinafter Sparrow],
where the Supreme Court applied this principle directly to s. 35(1).
K. McNeil

Another option which Aboriginal leaders are considering is to
unilaterally assert jurisdiction." This approach is consistent with
self-government as an inherent right, but is certain to be
challenged in court. When that happens, Aboriginal governments
could either refuse to recognize the jurisdiction of Canadian
courts, 14 or claim that self-government is an Aboriginal and treaty
right which is already entrenched in s. 35(1) of the Constitution
Act, 1982.15

The issue of whether s. 35(1) recognizes and affirms a right of
self-government has not been directly addressed by Canadian
courts.' 6 However, judicial decisions have given the section some
content, particularly by applying it to Aboriginal and treaty rights

13. See Geoffrey York, "Natives to move ahead with own laws" The [Toronto]
Globe and Mail (20 November 1992) A5.
14. This could have serious consequences. During the stand-off at
Oka/Kanesatake in 1990, the Canadian government clearly demonstrated that it
was willing to use military force to impose jurisdiction on Aboriginal people who
denied the authority of the Canadian state.
15. For Aboriginal expression of this view, see: Harold Cardinal, "Indian Nations
and Constitutional Change" in J.A. Long and M. Boldt, eds., Governments in
Conflict?Provincesand Indian Nations in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1988) 83 at 85-87; Gordon Peters, "Statement to the House of Commons
Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development," Minutes
of Proceedings and Evidence (3 March 1987) at 17: 5-7. A joint Aboriginal proposal
at the 1987 constitutional conference confirmed this interpretation by proposing
in part: "35(5)(a) For greater certainty, the inherent right of self-government...
of all the Indian, Inuit and Metis peoples of Canada is recognized and affirmed in
subsection (1)." See Assembly of First Nations, Native Council of Canada, Metis
National Council, and Inuit Committee on National Issues, "Joint Aboriginal
Proposal for Self-Government," (26-27 March 1987). For scholarly support, see
Bruce Clark, Native Liberty, Crown Sovereignty: The Existing Aboriginal Right of
Self-Government in Canada(Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990); and
"First Nations and the Constitution," supra note 2 at 279.
16. Some trial decisions have, however, denied the existence of an Aboriginal
right of self-government in other contexts. See: Logan v. Styres (1959), 20 D.L.R.
(2d) 416 (Ont. H.C.) [hereinafter Logan]; Ontario(A.G.) v. Bear Island Foundation,
[1985] 1 C.N.L.R. 1 (Ont. S.C.) at 78 and 80 [hereinafter Bear Island]; Delgamuukw
v. British Columbia (1991), 79 D.L.R. (4th) 185 (B.C.S.C.) especially at 452-454
[hereinafter Delgamuukw]. However, as these are lower court decisions which did
not take into account the effect of s. 35(1), the issue of whether that section
includes a right of self-government must be regarded as open.
19 Queen's Law Journal

to hunt and fish.17 The leading case is the decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Sparrow,18 in which a member
of the Musqueam Nation in British Columbia was charged for
fishing with a drift net which exceeded the length allowed by the
Musqueams' food fishing licence, issued pursuant to the federal
Fisheries Act. 9 The appellant contended that the licence's
restrictions on net length were inconsistent with his Aboriginal
right to fish, and were therefore invalid due to s. 35(1). In the
unanimous opinion of the Court, delivered by Dickson C.J.C. and
La Forest J., s. 35(1) provides constitutional protection to
Aboriginal rights which were not extinguished prior to April 17,
1982, when the ConstitutionAct, 1982 was proclaimed in force.2"
Prior to that, case law had established that these rights were
generally subject to infringement and extinguishment by the
Parliament of Canada.2' According to the Sparrow decision,

17. The main Court of Appeal decisions are: R. v. Eninew; R. v. Bear (1984), 10
D.L.R. (4th) 137 (Sask. C.A.); R. v. Hare and Debassige, [1985] 3 C.N.L.R. 139
(Ont. C.A.); R. v. Agawa, [1988] 3 C.N.L.R. 73 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal denied
[1991] 1 C.N.L.R. vi (S.C.C.) [hereinafter Agawa]; R. v. Denny, [1990] 2 C.N.L.R.
115 (N.S.S.C.A.D.); R. v. Bombay, [1993] 1 C.N.L.R. 92 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter
Bombay]. See also Re Tagornak Adoption Petition, [1984] 1 C.N.L.R. 185
(N.W.T.S.C.), where Marshall J. held that the customary adoption laws of an
Aboriginal people are recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1). However, decisions
involving s. 35(1) rendered before Sparrow, supra note 12, should be approached
with caution, as they now must be read subject to the Supreme Court of Canada's
decision in that case.
18. Supra note 12.
19. R.S.C. 1970, c. F-14.
20. As the Sparrow case involved an Aboriginal right, the Court did not explicitly
deal with treaty rights. However, as both Aboriginal and treaty rights receive the
same protection in s. 35(1), their constitutional status should be the same. See e.g.
Agawa, supra note 17; R. v. Flett (1989), 60 Man. R. (2d) 294 (Q.B.), leave to appeal
denied [1991] 1 C.N.L.C. 140; R. v.Joseph, [1990] 4 C.N.L.R. 59 (B.C.S.C.); R. v.
Littlewolf, R. v. Potts, [1992] 3 C.N.L.R. 100 (Alta. Q.B.), leave to appeal denied
[1993] 1 C.N.L.R. vi; Bombay, supra note 17. While my discussion of s. 35(1) in the
context of Sparrow will focus on Aboriginal rights, it should be kept in mind that
the analysis is generally applicable to treaty rights as well.
21. See R. v. Derriksan (1976), 71 D.L.R. (3d) 159 (S.C.C.). On the vulnerability
of treaty rights, see R. v. Sikyea (1964), 43 D.L.R. (2d) 150 (N.W.T.C.A.), aff'd
[1964] S.C.R. 642; R. v. George, [1966] S.C.R. 267 [hereinafter George]; Daniels v.
K. McNeil

however, s. 35(1) did not entirely exclude the parliamentary power
to infringe these rights by regulation.22 That power still exists,
but due to the section it can only be exercised if the infringement
can be justified under a test which the Supreme Court set out.23

White and the Queen, [1968] S.C.R. 517 [hereinafter Daniels].Note, however, that
Aboriginal rights may be protected in at least some parts of Canada by constitutional provisions in place before 1982: see e.g. discussion of the Rupert's Land and
North-Western Territory Order in Kent McNeil, Native Claims in Rupert's Land
and the North-Western Territory: Canada's ConstitutionalObligations (Saskatoon:
University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1982), and of the Royal Proclamation and other constitutional instruments in Clark, supra note 15.
22. As the Court did not expressly state that these rights could still be
extinguished by federal legislation as well, this issue has been left in doubt. On the
one hand, the clear distinction which the Court drew between regulation and
extinguishment would seem to preclude the use of the regulatory power to effect
an extinguishment: Sparrow, supra note 12 at 1097-1099. On the other, the Court
said, at 1109, that "federal power must be reconciled with federal duty and the best
way to achieve that reconciliation is to demand the justification of any government
regulation that infringes upon or denies aboriginal rights [my emphasis]." Also, at
1119, the Court seems to have envisaged the possibility of expropriation of an
Aboriginal right, which would raise the matter of compensation. If expropriation
is equivalent to extinguishment, this may mean that a limited parliamentary power
of extinguishment has survived the enactment of s. 35(1): see W.I.C. Binnie, "The
Sparrow Doctrine: Beginning of the End or End of the Beginning?" (1990) 15
Queen's Law Journal 217 at 238-239; compare Hogg, supra note 2 at 692.
23. Prior to the coming into force of s. 35(1), Aboriginal rights (but not treaty
rights) were to some extent subject to provincial legislation as well. See e.g.:
Kruger v. R., [1978] 1 S.C.R. 104 [hereinafter Kruger]; Dick v. R., [1985] 2 S.C.R.
309; Jack and Charlie v. R., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 332 [hereinafterJackand Charlie]; Kent
McNeil, Indian Hunting, Trapping and Fishing Rights in the PrairieProvinces of
Canada(Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1983) at 11-19;
Bruce Ryder, "The Demise and Rise of the Classical Paradigm in Canadian
Federalism: Promoting Autonomy for the Provinces and First Nations" (1991) 36
McGill L.J. 308 at 362-380. Although Sparrow did not involve provincial legislation, the Court did say that s. 35(1) "affords aboriginal peoples constitutional
protection against provincial legislative power": supra note 12 at 1105. However,
as the extent of that protection was not specified, uncertainty remains over
whether the protection is absolute or subject to the same justificatory test as federal
legislation. See: Slattery, "First Nations and the Constitution", supra note 2 at 284285, where it is argued convincingly that the test is not available to justify
provincial legislation; Hogg, supra note 2 at 693, where the same conclusion is
reached. See also Hydro-Quebec v. Canada (A.G.) and Coon Come, [1991] 3
C.N.L.R. 40 (Que. C.A.) at 59, and infra note 150.
19 Queen's Law Journal

The Supreme Court's test for justification is as follows. Once it
has been shown that Parliament has infringed an existing
Aboriginal right, the party relying on the infringement has to
prove two things. First, a valid legislative objective for the
infringing legislation must be shown. Examples of valid objectives
would include preserving Aboriginal rights by conserving and
managing a resource, and protecting the public or Aboriginal
peoples from the harmful exercise of those rights. However, a
claim that the regulations were "in the public interest" would be
too vague to qualify. If this initial burden is met, the second step
in justifying an infringement involves proving that the legislation
is as consistent as possible, in the circumstances, with constitutional recognition and affirmation of the right. The Supreme
Court referred to a number of considerations which are relevant
in deciding whether the legislation meets the required standard. To
start with, "[t]he special trust relationship and the responsibility of
the government vis-a-vis aboriginals must be the first consideration
in determining whether the legislation or action in question can be
justified."24 Other relevant questions include "whether there has
been as little infringement as possible in order to effect the desired
result; whether, in a situation of expropriation, fair compensation
is available; and, whether the aboriginal group in question has
been consulted with respect to the [particular] measures being
implemented."25 The objective of the analysis is to guarantee that
the legislation "treat[s] aboriginal peoples in a way ensuring that
their rights are taken seriously."26 Broadly speaking, "recognition
and affirmation requires sensitivity to and respect for the rights of
aboriginal peoples on behalf of the government, courts and indeed
all Canadians."27 In the context of Sparrow, recognition and affirmation of the Aboriginal right to fish for food and ceremonial
purposes meant that federal regulations with the valid legislative
objective of conservation had to give Aboriginal fishing for those
purposes priority over sport and commercial fishing.

24. Sparrow, supra note 12 at 1114.
25. Ibid. at 1119.
26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.
K. McNeil

The Sparrow decision raises a number of important Aboriginal

rights issues which cannot be addressed here.2" Instead, this article
is going to focus on two specific questions arising out of the decision. First, what prompted the Supreme Court to decide that the
rights which are recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1) can still be

infringed by Parliamentary regulation as long as the test of justification is met? Secondly, what are the implications of that aspect
of the decision for First Nation self-government as a s. 35(1) right?

I. Parliamentary Infringement of
Section 35(1) Rights
Section 35 is contained in Part II of the ConstitutionAct, 1982,
after the Canadian Charterof Rights and Freedoms, which forms
Part I of the Act. So s. 1 of the Charter,providing that the rights
and freedoms set out in it are "subject only to such reasonable
limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free
and democratic society," does not apply to s. 35(1) rights. The
Supreme Court acknowledged this in Sparrow. However, the
Court went on to say that
this does not mean that any law or regulation affecting aboriginal rights will
automatically be of no force or effect by the operation of s. 52 of the Constitution
Act, 1982. Legislation that affects the exercise of aboriginal rights will nonetheless
be valid, if it meets the test for justifying an interference with a right recognized
and affirmed under s. 35().29

28. For commentary on the decision, see: Binnie, supra note 22; Patrick Macklem,
"First Nations Self-Government and the Borders of the Canadian Legal Imagination" (1991) 36 McGill L.J. 382 at 445-450; Michael Asch and Patrick Macklem,
"Aboriginal Rights and Canadian Sovereignty: An Essay on R. v. Sparrow" (1991)
29 Alta. L. Rev. 498; Frank Cassidy, "The Spirit of Sparrow: Aboriginal Rights and
'The Honour of the Crown"' (March 1991) [unpublished]; David W. Elliott, "In
the Wake of Sparrow: A New Department of Fisheries?" (1991) 40 U.N.B.L.J. 23;
M.E. Turpel, "In SparrowWe Trust: Federal and Provincial Fiduciary Responsibilities" (1 November 1991) [unpublished]; Calvin D. Helin, "The Fishing Rights and
Privileges of B.C.'s First Nations" [unpublished, no date]; Slattery, "First Nations
and the Constitution," supra note 2 at 279-286.
29. Sparrow, supra note 12 at 1109. Section 52(1) is reproduced infra note 33.

19 Queen's Law Journal

The Supreme Court then created the test described 'above for
assessing the validity of federal legislation, in terms which resemble
but tare. not identical to the terms of the s. 1 test the Court
formulated in R. v. Oakes.3"

My intention here is not to compare the Sparrow and Odkks..
tests, but to try to explain why the Court felt compelled to invent
such a test in Sparrow. Unlike s. 1, nothing in s. 35(1) invites the
judicial branch to engage in balancing valid legislative objectives
against constitutionally protected rights. 3' Arguably, by placing
s. 35 outside the Charter and thus beyond the reach of s. 1, the
legislators intended to prevent just that sort of judicial activism.32
However, the Supreme Court made no attempt to explain the

significance of the location of s. 35. Instead, after stating that
"[t]here is no explicit language in the provision that authorizes this
Court or any court to assess the legitimacy of any government

legislation that restricts aboriginal rights,"33 the judges offered the
following explanation for their interventionist approach:

30. [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 [hereinafter Oakes]. For commentary on s. 1, see Pamela
A. Chapman, "The Politics of Judging: Section 1 of the Charter of Rights and
Freedo'ms" (1986) 24 Osgoode Hall L.J. 867; Sidney R. Peck, "An Analytical Framework fdr the Application of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1987)
25 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1; Robin M. Elliot, "The Supreme Court of Canada and
Section 1 - The Erosion of the Common Front" (1987) 12 Queen's Law Journal,
277; Lorraine Eisenstat Weinrib, "The Supreme Court of Canada and Section 1 of
the Charter" (1988) 10 Supreme Court L.R. 469; Hogg, supra note 2 at 852-889.
31. See Clark, supra note 15 at 200-202.
32. Madam Justice B.M. McLachlin, in her article, "The Charter:A New Role for
the Judiciary?" (1991) 29 Alta. L. Rev. 540, suggests that judges have been
reluctantly forced by the Charter, in particular by s. 1, to make value judgments
about legislation. But in the case of s. 35(1), it appears that the Supreme Court has
willingly taken on such a role without the same obligation to do so.
33. Sparrow, supra note 12 at 1109. This is a puzzling statement, for while it is
true that s. 35(1) does not itself provide for judicial review of legislation restricting
Aboriginal rights, s. 52(1) does impose such an obligation on the courts by providirig:
"The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and iny law that
is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the
inconsistency, of no force or effect." In the passage from Sparrow accompanying
supra note 29, the Court appeared to accept this application of s. 52(1).
K. McNeil

Yet, we find that the words "recognition and affirmation" incorporate the fiduciary
relationship referred to earlier and so import some restraint on the exercise of
sovereign power. Rights that are recognized and affirmed are not absolute. Federal
legislative powers continue, including, of course, the right to legislate with respect
to Indians pursuant to s. 91(24) of the ConstitutionAct, 1867. These powers must,
however, now be read together with s. 35(1). In other words, federal power must
be reconciled with federal duty and the best way to achieve that reconciliation is
to demand the justification of any government regulation that infringes upon or
denies aboriginal rights.34

This passage suggests that the words "recognized and affirmed"
are insufficient to place Aboriginal rights completely beyond the
reach of federal legislative power. What those words apparently do
is prevent Parliament from breaching the fiduciary obligation
which the Crown owes to the Aboriginal peoples. In another
passage, the Court described the effect of s. 35(1) in these terms:
The way in which a legislative objective is to be attained must uphold the honour
of the Crown and must be in keeping with the unique contemporary relationship,
grounded in history and policy, between the Crown and Canada's aboriginal
peoples. The extent of legislative or regulatory impact on an existing aboriginal
right may be scrutinized so as to ensure recognition and affirmation."

The Supreme Court offered little justification for interpreting
the words "recognized and affirmed" as providing Aboriginal
rights with only some protection, but not an absolute guarantee,
against federal legislative infringement. Their interpretation should
be compared with that of Professor Brian Slattery, who undertook
an extensive examination of the meaning of the words "recognized
and affirmed" before concluding:
When section 35 states that existing aboriginal and treaty rights are "hereby
recognized and affirmed," it seems to mean that they are formally acknowledged
as valid in law and rendered sure and unavoidable.36

34. Ibid. at 1109.
35. Ibid. at 1110.
36. Slattery, "The Constitutional Guarantee," supra note 2 at 252. See also
Slattery, "The Hidden Constitution", supra note 2 at 380-385, where, subject to the
qualification referred to below in text accompanying note 39, Slattery fortified his
interpretation of s. 35(1) with s. 35(4) (added by the ConstitutionalAmendment
Proclamation,1983, see SI/84-102). Section 35(4) reads: "Notwithstandingany other
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By "unavoidable" Slattery apparently meant that legislation which
attempted either to nullify or restrict an Aboriginal right would
be inconsistent with the recognition and affirmation of that right
in the Constitution, and to that extent would be of no force or
effect due to s. 52(1)." However, in his later work Slattery
suggested that s. 35 rights could be overridden in exceptional

circumstances by federal legislation, but "only in emergencies, for
pressing public need."38 Finally, in "Understanding Aboriginal
Rights," an article which was relied upon extensively by the
Supreme Court in Sparrow, Slattery retained the national emer-

gency limitation and added two more qualifications, suggesting
that s. 35 rights would also be subject to:
(1) regulations that operate to preserve or advance section 35 rights (as by
conserving a natural resource essential to the exercise of such rights);
(2) regulations that prevent the exercise of section 35 rights from causing serious
harm to the general populace or native peoples themselves (such as standard safety
restrictions governing the use of fire-arms in hunting. 3"

It does not seem, however, that Slattery's apparent modification
of his earlier views was based on a reinterpretation of the meaning
of "recognized and affirmed." Instead, as a matter of policy he
appears to have become concerned that Aboriginal rights to hunt

and fish, for example, would be entirely unregulated if those views
were adopted. After suggesting that one approach to s. 35(1) would

be to hold that it "recognizes unextinguished aboriginal rights in
their original form, so that any regulations restricting their
exercise are invalid," he wrote:

provision of this Act, the aboriginal and treaty rights referred to in subsection (1)
are guaranteed equally to male and female persons." As Slattery pointed out at 383,
the "word 'guaranteed' is significant, because it plainly indicates an intent to
entrench." In fact, the same word is used in s. 1 to entrench Charter rights.
37. Slattery, "The Constitutional Guarantee," supra note 2 at 254-262. Section
52(1) is reproduced supra note 33.
38. Slattery, "The Hidden Constitution," supra note 2 at 384. The override suggested by Slattery appears to be similar to the federal power under "Peace, Order,
and good Government" in s. 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867 to impinge on
provincial jurisdiction in national emergencies: see Hogg, supra note 2 at 452-462.
39. Slattery, "Understanding Aboriginal Rights," supra note 2 at 782.
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This approach leads to extreme consequences. It suggests, for example, that
regulations: implementing basic safety precautions in hunting, or protecting a rare
species of animal might be invalid. It seems, moreover, inconsistent with theword
"existing," which suggests that the rights in question are affirmed in a
contemporary form rather than in their primeval simplicity and vigour.45

The Supreme Court apparently shared this concern, but unlike
-,Slattery gave a restrictive interpretation to the words "recognized
arid affirmed" in! order to meet it.41 As I will explain in more
detail later, I thiik the Supreme Court's approach to this matter
had little to do with the actual words of s. 35(1), and a great deal
to do with policy considerations and the Court's constitutional
paradigm, with negative implications for Aboriginal -slfgovernment.
We have seen that the Supreme Court decided that s. 35(1)
constitutionalized the fiduciary relationship between the Crown
and the Aboriginal peoples.4" This does not appear to be because
this relationship is itself an Aboriginal or treaty right. Rather, in
the Court's view the general effect of the section is to elevate this
historic relationship to a constitutional level, where it can be used
to, protect, the rights that are recognized and affirmed against
:.legislation which is unjustifiable because it violates the relationship. But where does this interpretation of s. 35 come from? There
is no mention of this fiduciary relationship in s. 35. In fact, despite
its historical roots in the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and the
treaty-making process, the relationship was not even a recognized

40. Ibid. Slattery apparently thought that the presence of the word "existing"
supported his policy argument. However, I see no inconsistency between affirming
Aboriginal rights in their contemporary form, and exempting them from federal
regulatory power, unless one interprets "existing" as preserving the federal
regulatory power which existed prior to the enactment of s. 35(1), an interpretation
which Slattery clearly rejected, at least in his earlier work. See "The Constitutional
Guarantee," supra note 2 at 257-262, and "The Hidden Constitution," supra note 2
at 383.
41. On the effect of the word "existing," the Court relied on Slattery's
interpretation, not to imply a limited federal regulatory power, but to reject !the
"frozen rights" approach to s. 35(1) which some lower courts had taken: Sparrow,
* supra note 12 at 1091-1093. In the Supreme Court's view, "existing" means
"unextinguished:" ibid. at 1092.
. 42. For discussion of this aspect of the decision, see Turpel, supra note 28.
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legal concept in 1982."3 It first appeared on the scene as a major
element in Aboriginal rights jurisprudence in 1984 when the
Supreme Court decided Guerin v. Canada." But while seven out
of eight judges in that case found that the Crown has a fiduciary
obligation to the Aboriginal peoples, Dickson J. and three others
appear to have regarded the obligation as arising in a legal sense
only upon a surrender of Indian lands to the Crown.45 The idea
that the Crown has a broad fiduciary obligation to the Aboriginal
peoples in all its dealings with them was first expressed by the
Supreme Court in the Sparrow decision.46
One might wonder, then, how the Canadian legislators who
proposed the Constitution Act, 1982, and the British legislators
who enacted it, could have intended s. 35 to constitutionalize a
fiduciary relationship which no one at the time knew existed.

43. Discussion of the concept is generally absent from the academic literature on
s.35 published prior to Guerin v. Canada,[1984] 2 S.C.R. 335 (hereinafter Guerin];
see articles listed supra note 2. See also Maureen Ann Donohue, "Aboriginal Land
Rights in Canada: A Historical Perspective on the Fiduciary Relationship" (1990)
15 Am. Indian L. Rev. 369, especially at 382-387.
44. Supra note 43. See discussion in: Richard Bartlett, "You Can't Trust the
Crown. The Fiduciary Obligation of the Crown to the Indians: Guerin v. The
Queen" (1985) 49 Sask. L. Rev. 367; John D. Hurley, "The Crown's Fiduciary
Duty and Indian Title: Guerin v. The Queen" (1985) 30 McGill L.J. 559; D. Paul
Emond, "Case Comment: Guerin v. R." (1986) 20 E.T.R. 61; William R. McMurtry
and Alan Pratt, "Indians and the Fiduciary Concept, Self-Government and the
Constitution: Guerin in Perspective" (1986) 3 C.N.L.R. 19; and Darlene Johnston,
"A Theory of Crown Trust towards Aboriginal Peoples" (1986) 18 Ottawa L.
Rev. 307.
45. Guerin, supra note 43 at 375-387. Wilson J. and two others thought the
obligation existed before surrender, but they nonetheless related it directly to
Indian lands: ibid. at 348-350.
46. Supra note 12 at 1108: "In our opinion, Guerin, together with R. v. Taylor
and Williams (1981), 34 O.R. (2d) 360, ground a general guiding principle for s.
35(1). That is, the Government has the responsibility to act in a fiduciary capacity
with respect to aboriginal peoples. The relationship between the Government and
aboriginals is trust-like, rather than adversarial, and contemporary recognition and
affirmation of aboriginal rights must be defined in light of this historic
relationship." Note that the aspect of Taylor and Williams relied on by the
Supreme Court in Sparrow was that, in interpreting Indian treaties, courts must
keep in mind that "the honour of the Crown is always involved and no appearance
of 'sharp dealing' should be sanctioned": 34 O.R. (2d) 360 at 367.
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Admittedly, what matters in the context of statutory interpretation is not the actual intention of the legislators, but the
legislative objective or purpose behind the statute.47 In Sparrow,
the Supreme Court took a purposive approach to s. 35, acknowledging that it "represents the culmination of a long and difficult
struggle in both the political forum and the courts for the constitutional recognition of aboriginal rights."48 The approach to be
taken in interpreting it, the Court said, "isderived from general
principles of constitutional interpretation, principles relating to
aboriginal rights, and the purposes behind the constitutional
provision itself."49 Moreover, "[w]hen the purposes of the affirmation of aboriginal rights are considered, it is clear that a
generous, liberal interpretation of the words in the constitutional
provision is demanded."" However, an examination of the
Court's discussion of actual legislative purpose reveals little beyond
a general desire to protect rights, which in the past "were often
honoured in the breach," from legislative infringement.5 1 The
Court did not suggest there was evidence of an intention to
entrench a fiduciary relationship.
The question which remains unanswered is this: Given the
legislative purpose to constitutionalize Aboriginal rights, and the
desire to give s. 35(1) "a generous, liberal interpretation,"52 why
did the Supreme Court decide that those rights are still subject to
justifiable federal legislation? Why do "[f]ederal legislative powers
continue, including, of course, the right to legislate with respect to
Indians pursuant to s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867"?"3
A simple answer might be that the legislators who amended
Canada's Constitutionin 1982 would have repealed s. 91(24) if they
had intended Aboriginal rights to be immune from infringement

47. See T.R.S. Allan, "Legislative Supremacy and the Rule of Law: Democracy
and Constitutionalism" (1985) 44 Cambridge L.J. 111 at 117-118.
48. Supra note 12 at 1105.
49. Ibid. at 1106.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid. at 1102-1110, quoted words at 1103.

52. Ibid. at 1106.
53. Ibid. at 1109. See quote in text above, at note 34.
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by federal legislation. In other words, s. 91(24) would have no
work to do if Parliament could no longer legislate regarding
Aboriginal rights.54 But on closer examination, this explanation
is insufficient. Nothing in s. 35(1) prevents Parliament from
enacting legislation involving Aboriginal rights. Instead, it can be
interpreted as barring Parliament from infringing Aboriginal
rights, while leaving intact Parliament's jurisdiction to enact
legislation protecting or enhancing Aboriginal rights, for example
by ratifying a land claim agreement to which an Aboriginal people
has freely consented. Section 91(24) of the 1867 Act and s. 35 of
the 1982 Act must be read together in a purposive way that
enhances Aboriginal rights, in much the same way as ss. 91 and 92
of the 1867 Act must generally be read together with, and in a way
that promotes, Charterrights, but with this major difference: s. 35
rights are not subject to the qualification which s. 1 places on
Charter rights.
So I do not think that looking to s. 91(24) can provide an
explanation for why the Supreme Court decided that federal
power over Aboriginal rights continues, any more than the actual
words of s. 35, or the legislative purpose and principles of
construction, can explain the court's decision. However, an
explanation can perhaps be glimpsed in the following passage from

Sparrow:
The constitutional recognition afforded by the provision therefore gives a measure

of control over government conduct and a strong check on legislative power.
While it does not promise immunity from government regulation in a society that, in
the twentieth century, is increasingly more complex, interdependent and sophisticated,
and where exhaustible resources need protection and management, it does hold the
Crown to a substantive promise. The government is required to bear the burden
of justifying any legislation that has some negative effect on any aboriginal right
protected under s. 35(1) [my emphasis]."5

The emphasised words are a modified version of the more explicit
language used by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in
R. v. Sparrow to arrive at the same conclusion:

54. See Slattery, "First Nations and the Constitution", supra note 2 at 282-283.
55. Supra note 12 at 1110.
K. McNeil

The constitutional recognition of the right to fish cannot entail restoring the
relationship between Indians and salmon as it existed 150 years ago. The world has
changed. The right must now exist in the context of a parliamentary system of
government and a federal division of powers. It cannot be defined as if the
Musqueam band had continued to be a self-governing entity, or as if its members were
not citizens of Canada and residents of British Columbia. Any definition of the
existing right must take into account that it exists in the context of an industrial
society with all of its complexities and competing interests. The "existing right" in
1982 was one which had long been subject to regulation by the federal
government. It must continue to be so because only government can regulate with
due regard to the interests of all [my emphasis].5 6

In the view of the Court of Appeal, the constitutional right to
fish could not be regulated by self-governing Aboriginal peoples.
Lack of faith in the capacity of Aboriginal peoples to govern the
exercise of their rights is also implicit in the Supreme Court's
decision. Counsel for Sparrow argued that, due to s. 35(1), authority to regulate an Aboriginal right inheres in the people holding
the right, as "the right to regulate is part of the right to use the
resource." 7 Counsel speculated that federal regulations might
nonetheless be applicable, but only in exceptional circumstances,
where for example such measures were necessary to prevent serious impairment of
the aboriginal rights of present and future generations, where conservation could
only be acheived by restricting the right and not by restricting fishing by other
users, and where the aboriginalgroup concerned was unwilling to implement necessary
conservation measures [my emphasis].s"

The Supreme Court did not address the argument in favour of
self-regulation directly. However, the Court's view of the matter

56. (1986), 36 D.L.R. (4th) 246 (B.C.C.A.) at 272.
57. Supra note 12 at 1102. For another way of phrasing this argument, see Asch
and Macklem, supra note 28 at 506: "The right to fish was viewed by the Court [in
Sparrow] as a right because of its centrality to Musqueam culture. If fishing is
central to the Musqueam Nation, the ability to determine how this activity will
be carried out on Musqueam lands, between the Musqueam and others, and among
the Musqueam themselves, must also be central to its self-definition. That is, the
ability to pass laws or rules governing how the practice of fishing is to occur,
under the theory of aboriginal right adopted by the Court in Sparrow, equally
ought to qualify as an aboriginal right under s. 35(1)."
58. Supra note 12 at 1102.
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may be revealed in the following words, expressed almost
immediately after the passage just quoted:
It is worth recalling that while British policy towards the native population was
based on respect for their right to occupy their traditional lands, a proposition to
which the Royal Proclamation of 1763 bears witness, there was from the outset
never any doubt that sovereignty and legislative power, and indeed the underlying
9
title, to such lands vested in the Crown.

So the standard denial of the inherent right of the Aboriginal
peoples to govern themselves, a denial imbedded in Canadian
constitutional law,' appears to have been the Supreme Court's
starting point for assessing the effect of s. 35(1). It seems that the
Court was reluctant to alter the legislative power structure of
Canada by interpreting the section as creating a constitutionally
protected space for Aboriginal governments. 61 The Court's conclusion that "[f]ederal legislative powers continue '"62 therefore
should have come as no surprise.
In order to understand the judicial mindset which led to this
conclusion, I think it is necessary to examine the principles
underlying the Canadian Constitution. We have already observed
that Aboriginal governments were denied any constitutional status
in Canada prior to the ConstitutionAct, 1982. This denial is deeply
rooted in colonial attitudes, and a vision of the Canadian
Constitution which has been nurtured by British traditions. The
ConstitutionAct, 1982 could have changed that dramatically with

59. Ibid. at 1103. This passage should be compared with Quebec (A.G.) v. Sioui,
[1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025 [hereinafter Siou], decided just one week before Sparrow,
where the Supreme Court at 1052-1053 said that, at least up to 1760, both France
and Britain maintained relations with the Indian Nations "very close to those
maintained between sovereign nations." In light of Sioui, it is possible that the
Court in Sparrow intended only to assert the Crown's overarching sovereignty,
rather than to deny any internal right of self-government to the Aboriginal
peoples. However, the tenor of the Sparrow decision provides scant support for
such an interpretation.
60. See McNeil, supra note 1.
61. See Macklem, supranote 28 at 449-453; and Asch and Macklem, supra note 28,
especially at 506-508.
62. Supra note 12 at 1109 (see text accompanying supra note 34).
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respect to the rights of the Aboriginal peoples. If the Supreme
Court had decided that s. 35(1) shielded Aboriginal rights from
any attempt by Parliament or the provincial legislatures to infringe
or extinguish them,63 the section would necessarily have created
a constitutional space for the Aboriginal peoples to govern the
exercise of those rights themselves. In my view, a major reason
why the Court did not do that is because colonialism, and British
constitutionalism, still exert considerable influence over judicial
thinking in the context of Aboriginal rights.'

II. Foundations of the Canadian Constitution
The preamble to the ConstitutionAct, 186765 states that Canada
shall have "a Constitution similar in Principle to that of the
United Kingdom." The Act does not specify what that means, nor
does it contain any other statement of the general principles underlying the Canadian Constitution. Indeed, it is a rather technical
document, providing Canada with a federal system of government
with legislative powers divided between Parliament and the
provincial legislatures, without any of the high-sounding rhetoric
commonly found in other constitutions. To find the principles on
which the Canadian Constitution is based, one therefore has to go
behind the Constitution Act, 1867 and examine the British
Constitution.

A guiding principle of the British Constitutionis the doctrine of
parliamentary sovereignty or supremacy."' This concept

63. I have argued in the past that this is the way s. 35(1) should be interpreted:
see "Constitutional Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples" and "The Constitution Act,
1982," supra note 2.
64. For affirmation of this view in relation to judicial treatment of matrimonial
property issues on Indian reserves, see Mary Ellen Turpel, "Home/Land" (1991)
10 Can. J. Fam. Law 17.
65. (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3.
66. Both terms appear in the literature, with some writers preferring
"sovereignty" and others "supremacy:" see discussion in Stanley de Smith and
Rodney Brazier, Constitutionaland AdministrativeLaw, 6th ed. (London: Penguin
Books, 1986) at 64-65.
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developed out of centuries of struggle between the Crown and the

House of Commons, culminating in the seventeenth century with
the over-throw of the Stuarts, and the acceptance of the rule that
the Crown is subject to Parliament, the supreme law-making
author-ity." The power of the Crown, which at one time had

been virtually absolute, was gradually diminished to a residual
prerogative, exercisable most prominently in the area of foreign

affairs.68
With the triumph of Parliament, the idea that there are no legal
restrictions on its legislative power came to dominate British

constitutional thought.69 Earlier judicial dicta that Parliament
could not legislate contrary to common right and reason' were
no longer regarded as good law.7 At a more theoretical level, this
change in thinking was reflected in a jurisprudential shift away
from natural law concepts of fundamental rights to legal
positivism.72 By the mid-nineteenth century, the view that law is
the command of the sovereign was prevalent.73 Since Parliament

67. See: ibid. at 70-73; R.F.V. Heuston, Essays in ConstitutionalLaw, 2d ed. (London: Stevens & Sons, 1964) at 58-8 1; and E.C.S. Wade and A.W. Bradley, Constitutional and Administrative Law, 10th ed. (London: Longmans, 1985) at 60-63.
68. See Wade and Bradley, ibid. at 245-255; de Smith and Brazier, supra note 66
at 127-138.
69. Of course there are practical limitations, recognized in DeLolme's famous
statement that "[i]t is a fundamental principle with Engish lawyers, that Parliament
can do everything but make a woman a man, and a man a woman:" quoted in
A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 9th ed.
(London: Macmillan, 1939) at 43.
70. Dr. Bonham's Case (1610), 8 Co. Rep. 113 at 118. See also Day v. Savadge
(1614), Hob. 85 at 87, where it was said that Parliament could not "make a man
Judge in his own case."
71. See de Smith and Brazier, supra note 66 at 71-72; and Geoffrey Marshall,
ParliamentarySovereignty and the Commonwealth (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957)
at 68-71.
72. As de Smith and Brazier wrote, Blackstone's "lip-service to the primacy of
natural law" in 1765 was but a faint echo of earlier views which "had long since
ceased to have legal significance; for the judges had tacitly accepted a rule of
obligation to give effect to every Act of Parliament, no matter how preposterous
its content:" de Smith and Brazier, supra note 66 at 72.
73. John Austin was, of course, the leading proponent of this view, but Jeremy
Bentham and others had laid the foundations for positivist theory before him.
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was regarded as supreme, with authority to make or unmake any
law, the concepts of legal positivism and parliamentary sovereignty
were mutually reinforcing. It is therefore no coincidence that
Dicey's classic exposition of the doctrine of parliamentary
sovereignty was written in the late nineteenth century when legal
positivism dominated British jurisprudential thought. 4
The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is clearly one of the
principles of the British Constitution which the courts incorporated into the Canadian Constitution by means of the preamble

to the Constitution Act, 1867."5 But of course the doctrine has
never exactly fit the Canadian context. As Canada was originally
part of the British Empire, Canadian legislatures were subject to
the overriding supremacy of the British Parliament, as expressly
provided by the ColonialLaws Validity Act of 1865.76 Moreover,

74. Dicey, supra note 69 (1st ed., 1885). Dicey, in his discussion of the connection
between the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty and Austin's theory of
sovereignty, suggested that Austin's theory was probably influenced more by the
position of Parliament than vice versa: ibid. at 71-76. Note that Dicey's views on
the omnipotence of Parliament have been criticized by some constitutional
theorists who take a more restrictive approach: see especially Sir W. Ivor Jennings,
The Law and the Constitution, 5th ed. (London: University of London Press, 1959)
at 137-179; Heuston, supra note 67 at 1-7. The modern debate on the doctrine
revolves mainly around the issue of whether one Parliament can bind its successors,
in particular with "manner and form" legislation: see e.g. Geoffrey Marshall,
Constitutional Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971) at 35-57; F.M. Brookfield,
"Parliamentary Supremacy and Constitutional Entrenchment: A Jurisprudential
Approach" (1984) 5 Otago L. Rev. 603; R. Elliot, "Rethinking Manner and Form:
From Parliamentary Sovereignty to Constitutional Values" (1991) 29 Osgoode Hall
L.J. 215.
75. The courts would likely have done this even without the invitation contained
in the preamble, as they applied the doctrine to pre-Confederation legislation of
the Canadian colonies as well: see e.g. Labrador Company v. The Queen, [1893] A.C.
104 at 123, where the Privy Council decided that a provision of an 1856 Act of the
legislature of the Province of Canada could not be disregarded by the courts
"[e]ven if it could be proved that the legislature was deceived.... If a mistake has
been made, the legislature alone can correct it."
76. (U.K.) 28 & 29 Vict., c. 63. As Brian Slattery has convincingly shown in his
article, "The Independence of Canada" (1983) 5 Supreme Court L.R. 369 at 384385, the Act was merely declaratory in this respect, as otherwise the authority to
make it apply to the Crown's overseas dominions would have been lacking. Its
application to Canada, along with the general authority of the British Parliament
19 Queen's Law Journal

the Crown in Britain could veto Canadian legislation through the
exercise of the powers of reservation and disallowance in ss. 55 to
57 of the Constitution Act, 1867.77 The federal system itself
imposed an additional limitation on parliamentary sovereignty by
restricting the competence of the provincial legislatures to certain

subject matters, and by excluding matters within exclusive provincial jurisdiction from federal competence. 8 Some scholars see
further restrictions on the applicability of the doctrine arising
from the fact that, unlike Britain, Canada has an. entrenched,
written Constitution." These restrictions are even more extensive
toddy, given the limitations that the CharterofRights and Freedoms

places on both federal and provincial legislative competence."
I do not intend to enter into the debate over whether the courts

should have uncritically applied the doctrine of parliamentary
sovereignty in Canada. The fact is they have applied it, and as a
result it has become a guiding principle in Canadian constitutional

to legislate effectively for Canada apart from the British North America Acts (now
the ConstitutionActs), ended with the enactment of the Statute of Westminster, 1931
(U.K.), 22 Geo. V, c. 4. See ibid. at 390-399; and Hogg, supra note 2 at 47-51.
77. Supra note 65. Although these provisions have never been expressly repealed,
they have not been used since 1878; moreover, at the Imperial Conference of 1930
which preceeded the enactment of the Statute of Westminster, it was agreed that
they would no longer be used: see Hogg, supra note 2 at 46, n. 4.
78. See Robert Yalden, "Liberalism and Canadian Constitutional Law: Tensions
in an Evolving Vision of Liberty" (1988) 47 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 132 at 140; and
Hogg, supra note 2 at 302-303.
79. See Noel Lyon, "The Central Fallacy of Canadian Constitutional Law" (1976)
22 McGill L.J. 40; and Elliot, supra note 74 at 235-236.
80. See: Anne F. Bayefsky, "The Judicial Function under the CanadianCharter
ofRights and Freedoms" (1987) 32 McGill L.J. 791 at 810-811; Madam Justice Bertha
Wilson, "The Making of a Constitution: Approaches to Judicial Interpretation"
[1988] Public Law 370 at 371. Compare Hogg, supra note 2 at 305: "The [s. 33]
override provision ... preserves parliamentary supremacy over much of the
Charter." On the same page, Hogg even suggests that parliamentary sovereignty
in Canada has been perfected by the Constitution Act, 1982, as power to amend the
Constitution can now be exercised by the Canadian Parliament and the requisite
number of provincial legislatures: "If one thinks of the Part V amending
procedures as a third legislative process, then it is now literaly true that legislative
power in Canada is exhaustively distributed among Canadian institutions."
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law.8 Within their respective areas of jurisdiction, the Canadian
Parliament and the provincial legislatures have been said to be
supreme, with the same authority as the British Parliament.82
Moreover, all legislative and executive powers exercisable in
Canada have been thought to be distributed between the federal
and provincial governments. 3 In the words of Earl Loreburn,
"whatever belongs to self-government in Canada belongs either to
the Dominion or to the provinces, within the limits of the British
North America Act."84 By implication, the Constitution left no
residual powers of self-government to the Aboriginal peoples.8"
As a result, any governmental authority actually exercised by them
has been due either to sufferance, or to delegation under the
federal Indian Act 86 or other legislation. 7

81. On occasion, some members of the Supreme Court of Canada have attempted
to limit the application of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty in the interest
of fundamental human rights. See e.g.: Reference Re Alberta Statutes, [1938] S.C.R.
100; Saumur v. Quebec (City ojg, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299; Switzman v. Elbling and
Quebec (A.G.), [1957] S.C.R. 285. However, these "implied bill of rights" cases
failed to overturn the dominant view that it is not up to the courts to question the
wisdom of legislation. When the Court was confronted with a real Bill of Rights
after 1960, it briefly took on its new role of assessing legislation in R. v. Drybones,
[1970] S.C.R. 282, and then quickly retreated to a more traditional position of
deference. See: Lyon, supra note 79 at 50-58; Walter Surma Tarnopolsky, The
CanadianBill ofRights, 2d ed. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1975) especially
at 294-304; Berend Hovius and Robert Martin, "The Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms in the Supreme Court of Canada" (1983) 61 Can. Bar Rev. 354,
especially at 374-376.
82. See: Hodge v. R. (1883), 9 App. Cas. 117 at 132 (P.C.); Liquidators of the

Maritime Bank of Canadav. New Brunswick (Receiver General),[1892] A.C. 437 at
442 (P.C.). For critical comment see Lyon, supra note 79 at 43-44.
83. See: Bank of Toronto v. Lambe (1887), 12 App. Cas. 575 at 587 fJ.C.P.C.);
Union Colliery Co. v. Bryden, [1899] A.C. 580 (P.C.); Murphy v. C.P.R., [1958]
S.C.R. 626 at 643; Jones v. New Brunswick (A.G.), [1975] 2 S.C.R. 182 at 195.
84. Ontario(A.G.) v. Canada (A.G.), [1912] A.C. 571 at 584 (P.C.).
85. For discussion, see Ryder, supra note 23 at 310-316.
86. R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5. See Bear Island, supra note 16 at 78 and 80; and Logan,

supra note 16.
87. See e.g. James Bay and Northern Quebec Native Claims Settlement Act, S.C.
1976-77, c. 32; Loi approuvant la Convention de la BaieJames et du Nord quibicois,
L.R.Q. 1977 c. C-67; Sechelt Indian Band Self-Government Act, S.C. 1986, c. 27;

Secbelt Indian Government District Enabling Act, S.B.C. 1987, c. 16.
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The enactment of the Constitution Act, 1982 provided an
opportunity to end the colonialism inherent in the view that
legislative powers were exhaustively distributed in 1867 between
the federal and provincial governments. The Charter, and the
express provision in s. 52(1) that the "Constitution of Canada is
the supreme law of Canada," made a reassessment of the doctrine
of parliamentary sovereignty imperative, as certain matters were
clearly placed beyond the competence of either order of government.88 Where the Aboriginal peoples are concerned, s. 35(1)
demanded a reassessment of this kind by recognizing and affirming
their Aboriginal and treaty rights. The section could have been
interpreted as placing those rights outside federal and provincial
jurisdiction. This would have created a jurisdictional vacuum
which could have been filled by Aboriginal governments, terminating the constitutional colonialism under which the Aboriginal
peoples have suffered since 1867.
To understand further why the Supreme Court did not interpret
s. 35(1) this way in Sparrow, attention must be given to another
fundamental principle of the British Constitution, namely the rule
of law.89 This rule was implicitly included in the Canadian
Constitution by the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867.' Its
constitutional status has since been affirmed by the preamble to
the ConstitutionAct, 1982, which states that "Canada is founded
on principles that recognize the supremacy of God and the rule of
law."91 In addition, the Supreme Court of Canada has said that

88. Note that this was the case to a lesser extent even before the 1982 Act, as
certain matters, such as some official uses of the French and English languages in
Quebec, Manitoba, and at the federal level, were already constitutionally protected:
see Ryder, supra note 23 at 310, n. 4, and discussion of Reference Re Manitoba
LanguageRights, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721 [hereinafter ManitobaLanguageRights], in text
accompanying infra notes 96-108.
89. On this rule, see generally Dicey, supra note 69, especially at 187-203;
Jennings, supra note 74 at 42-62 and 305-317; Heuston, supra note 67 at 32-57;
Wade and Bradley, supra note 67 at 91-104; and Allan C. Hutchinson and Patrick
Monahan, eds., The Rule of Law: Ideal or Ideology (Toronto: Carswell, 1987).
90. By the words "with a Constitution similar in principle to that of the United
Kingdom:" see Manitoba Language Rights, supra note 88 at 750.
91. Ibid.
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the rule is "clearly implicit in the very nature of a Constitution,"
even if not specifically set out.92

The rule of law has two main aspects."3 First, it entails that, to
,-govern, the relationships and dealings of people in society, a
generally accepted and enforceable body of law exist. This body of
law provides stability and order, and guides the members of the
society in their interactions with one another. Second, the rule of

law requires that everyone, including government officials, be
subject to the accepted body of law, and act in accordance with it.
In other words, no one is above the law. This protects the members of the society from arbitrary acts by persons in authority,
ensuring that they do not interfer with rights and freedoms

without legal justification."
It is the first aspect of the rule of law that is particularly
relevant to the Supreme Court's interpretation of s. 35(1) in

Sparrow. Its primacy in Canadian constitutional law is revealed by
the Court's earlier unanimous decision in Reference Re Manitoba
LanguageRights.95 This decision considered the effect of an earlier
ruling that an 1890 Manitoba statute,96 purporting to revoke the
official status of the French language in the province, was
unconstitutional because it violated s. 23 of the Manitoba Act,

92. Ibid. at 750-751.
93. Ibid. at 748-750. Note that in my discussion I am reversing the order of the
Supreme Court's treatment of these aspects in the ManitobaLanguage Rights case.
94. See: Entick v. Carrington (1765), 19 How. S.T. 1030 (C.P.); Roncarelli v.
Duplessis, [1959] S.C.R. 121. For an insightful discussion of this aspect of the rule,
see Allan, supra note 47 at 111-143.
95. Supra note 88. For discussion, see: Margaret A. Banks, "Defining
'Constitution of the province' - The Crux of the Manitoba Language
Controversy" (1986) 31 McGill L.J. 466; S.J. Whitley, "The Manitoba Language
Reference: Judicial Consideration of 'Language Charged with Meaning'" (1986) 15
Man. L.J. 295; Dale Gibson and Kristin Lercher, "Reliance on Unconstitutional
Laws: The Saving Doctrines and Other Protections" (1986) 15 Man. LJ. 305;
Denise Reaume, "Language, Rights, Remedies, and the Rule of Law" (1988) 1 Can.
J. Law & Jur. 35
96. An Act to Provide that the English Language shall be the Official Language of
the Province of Manitoba, S.M. 1890, c. 14.
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1870."7 The Supreme Court decided that, because the 1890 statute
was unconstitutional, every Manitoba enactment in English only
was "invalid and of no force or effect. '98 As almost all the
enactments since 1890 fell into this category, the Court was then
faced with the repercussions of invalidating most of the statute law
in Manitoba. Unless some solution could be found, the Court
realized that "a legal vacuum [would] be created with consequent
legal chaos in the Province."" More specifically, "the positive
legal order which [had] purportedly regulated the affairs of the
citizens of Manitoba since 1890 [would] be destroyed and the
rights, obligations and other effects arising under these laws
[would] be invalid and unenforceable. " "
The Court's solution to this problem was to invoke the rule of
law as a fundamental constitutional principle to maintain the application of the invalid statutes until they could be translated into
French, and re-enacted in both official languages. In this way, the
Court was able "to recognize the unconstitutionality of Manitoba's
unilingual laws and the Legislature's duty to comply with the
'supreme law' of this country, while avoiding a legal vacuum in
Manitoba and ensuring the continuity of the rule of law."' 1
The Court arrived at this solution by giving paramountcy to the
principle of the rule of law, one of the "unwritten postulates
which form the very foundation of the Constitution of
Canada."' 2 In doing so, the judges gave more weight to implied
legislative intent than to strict textual construction:
This Court cannot take a narrow and literal approach to constitutional
interpretation. The jurisprudence of the Court evidences a willingness to

97. S.C. 1870, c. 3, affirmed by the Constitution Act, 1871 (previously the British
North America Act, 34 & 35 Vict., c. 28 (U.K.) ). Manitoba (A.G.) v. Forest, [1979]
2 S.C.R. 1032, decided that the 1890 statute was in conflict with s. 23, and

therefore invalid.
98. Supra note 88 at 747.
99. Ibid. at 747.

100. Ibid. at 749.
101. Ibid. at 753.
102. Ibid. at 752.
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supplement textual analysis with historical, contextual and purposive interpretation
in order to ascertain the intent of the makers of our Constitution. 3

In the Court's view, "[t]he founders of this nation must have
intended, as one of the basic principles of nation building, that
Canada be a society of legal order and normative structure: one
governed by rule of law."'O The Court would not permit this
principle to be violated by allowing strict application of the
Constitution to create chaos and disorder.' More specifically,
[t]he Constitution will not suffer a province without laws. Thus the Constitution
requires that temporary validity and force and effect be given to the current Acts

of the Manitoba Legislature .... It is only in this way that legal chaos can be
avoided and the rule of law preserved.' 6

Avoiding legal chaos through the application of the rule of law is
therefore a paramount constitutional value which takes precedence
07
over the written terms of the Constitution.
In my view, the Supreme Court's approach to the language
rights issue in Manitoba may help to explain why the Court was
unwilling to interpret s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 as
providing Aboriginal and treaty rights with absolute protection
against federal laws. Unless there are Aboriginal laws'0 8
governing Aboriginal and treaty rights throughout Canada, this
inter-pretation would have created a partial legal vacuum, which
was the very thing the Court took such pains to avoid in
Manitoba. In the context of Sparrow, the legal vacuum would have
encompassed Aboriginal fishing for food and ceremonial purposes,
which would have been completely unregulated in the absence of

103. Ibid. at 751.
104. Ibid.
105. Ibid. at 766.

106. Ibid. at 767.
107. By maintaining the validity of Manitoba's statutes until they could be translated and re-enacted, the Court temporarily overrode the explicit terms of s. 52(1)
of the ConstitutionAct, 1982 that "any law that is inconsistent with the provisions
of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect."
108. By "Aboriginal laws" I mean the laws of the Aboriginal peoples themselves,

whether derived from custom, 'legislative' enactment, or some other source.
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Aboriginal laws governing this activity. The Supreme Court found

this possibility unacceptable, as it could lead to depletion of the
very resource which makes the Aboriginal right to fish
meaningful. So, in the Court's view, federal legislative authority

over Aboriginal fishing had to continue in the interest of
conservation, subject to the justificatory test we have already
discussed.
But Aboriginal and treaty rights cover much more than fishing

for food and ceremonial purposes. In many cases, they probably
include fishing for commercial purposes as well."° They
generally include hunting and trapping, which can also be commercial. " ' Aboriginal rights encompass the use of other natural
products of lands and waters covered by Aboriginal title, as well

as an interest in the land itself.1 ' They may also include any
other uses to which Aboriginal lands can be put, such as agriculture and commercial development."' Aboriginal and treaty

rights probably both extend to the maintenance of Aboriginal
customs and traditions, including the use of Aboriginal languages,"'

and the practice

of Aboriginal spirituality."'

In

109. See: Agawa, supra note 17; R. v. Vanderpeet, [1991] 3 C.N.L.R. 161
(B.G.S.C.).
110. See e.g. Horseman v. R., [1990] 1 S.C.R. 901 [hereinafter Horseman], where
it was held that a treaty right to hunt commercially had been taken away in
Alberta by the Natural Resources TransferAgreement, 1930.
111. The nature of this interest has never been clearly determined by Canadian
courts: see discussion in Slattery, "Understanding Aboriginal Rights," supra note
2; Kent McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989)
at 267-290, and "The Temagami Indian Land Claim: Loosening the Judicial Straitjacket" in Matt Bray and Ashley Thomson, eds., Temagami:A Debate on Wilderness
(Toronto: Dundern Press, 1990) 185. Nor was the matter clarified by Delgamuukw,
supra note 16, a decision which has been severely criticized. See: Frank Cassidy,
ed., Aboriginal Title in British Columbia. Delgamuukw v. The Queen (Lantzville,
B.C.: Oolichan Books, 1992). Compare Mabo v. Queensland (1992), 175 C.L.R. 1,
on Aboriginal title in Australia.
112. See Slattery, "Understanding Aboriginal Rights," supra note 2 at 746-748.
113. See Brian Slattery, "Aboriginal Language Rights" in David Schneiderman,
ed., Language and the State: The Law and Politicsof Identity (Cowansville, Que.: Les
Editions Yvone Blais, 1991) at 369-374.
114. See Jack and Charlie,supra note 23.
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short, Aboriginal and treaty rights arguably cover all aspects of
Aboriginal life. To the extent that those rights were not extinguished prior to the enactment of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, they
are recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1).
The Supreme Court is obviously aware of the uncertain and
potentially open-ended nature of Aboriginal and treaty rights.'
In deciding Sparrow, it knew that the general interpretation it
placed on s. 35(1) would apply not only to the Aboriginal right of
the Musqueam Nation to fish for food and ceremonial purposes,
but to every Aboriginal and treaty right of all the Aboriginal
peoples across Canada. If the Court had decided that those rights
are beyond the regulatory power of both the federal and
provincial legislatures, that could have created a legal vacuum
which might have been even more damaging to public order and
the stability of Canadian society, from the perspective of the
judges, than a declaration that almost all the provincial statutes in
Manitoba were void. The rule of law, as the Court understood and
articulated that concept in the Manitoba Language Rights decision,
would have been violated. As in the case of Manitoba, the Court
was therefore willing to bend the actual terms of the Constitution
to avoid that result. Where the unilingual Manitoba statutes were
concerned, it did this by maintaining their force until they could
be translated and re-enacted in both official languages. Where
Aboriginal and treaty rights were concerned, it accomplished the
same thing by maintaining federal jurisdiction over them, subject
to the justificatory test which the Court created." 6
However, relying on the rule of law to explain this continuation
of federal jurisdiction is problematic because it seems to assume
that the Aboriginal peoples do not have adequate laws of their
own to govern the exercise of their rights. But the absence of such
laws should not be assumed, particularly in light of modern

115. The Court itself has avoided giving a clear definition of Aboriginal title,
which is just one element of Aboriginal rights: see Guerin, supra note 43, and

discussion in McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title, supra note 111 at 284-289.
116. While this objective was not articulated in the Sparrow decision, the
ManitobaLanguageRights case was referred to, in suppport of the Supreme Court's
purposive interpretation of s. 35(1): Sparrow, supra note 12 at 1106.
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anthropological evidence that all societies have rules governing
interactions among their members.117 Of course those rules vary
from one society to another, and do not necessarily cover the same
aspects of human behavior. Moreover, the mechanisms for enforcement of the rules can be very different." 8 However, these are
not reasons for denying these rules the status of laws. The
assumption that Aboriginal societies do not have laws governing
activities such as fishing should not be made without a factual
basis. Furthermore, one should not expect Aboriginal laws
necessarily to be enacted by legislative bodies, or to be written
down. Those expectations would be ethnocentric and inappropriate, as they would involve imposing Euro-Canadian standards
on Aboriginal societies.119
The Supreme Court may not have assumed in Sparrow that the
Musqueam Nation had no laws of its own governing fishing by its
members. But it did seem to think that any laws the Musqueam
may have had would be inadequate to regulate their fishing in the
interest of conservation because, as we have seen, the Court said
that s. 35(1) did not provide them with "immunity from government regulation in a society that, in the twentieth century, is
increasingly more complex, interdependent and sophisticated, and
where exhaustible resources need protection and management."12
The word "government" in this passage obviously means the kind
of government the judges are accustomed to, in this context the
federal government. The Court did not envisage that Aboriginal
governments would be capable of ensuring that finite resources are

117. See Michael Asch, "Errors in Delgamuukw: An Anthropolgical Perspective"
in Cassidy, ed., supra note 112 at 221-43, especially 224-225.

118. See e.g.: Michael Coyle, "Traditional Indian Justice in Ontario: A Role for
the Present?" (1986) 24 Osgoode Hall L.J. 605; A.C. Hamilton and C.M. Sinclair,
Report of the AboriginalJustice Inquiry of Manitoba, Vol. 1: The Justice System and
Aboriginal People (Winnipeg: Province of Manitoba, 1991) at 22-29; Michael
Jackson, "In Search of the Pathways to Justice: Alternative Dispute Resolution in

Aboriginal Communities" (1992) Special Ed. U.B.C. L. Rev. 147.
119. See Michael Asch and Catherine Bell, "Definition and Interpretation of Fact
in Canadian Aboriginal Title Litigation: A Comment on Delgamuukw" (February
1993) [unpublished].

120. Supra note 12 at 1110.
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not depleted by Aboriginal use. The colonial vision of the
Canadian Constitution, based on parliamentary sovereignty and
exhaustive distribution of powers between the federal and
provincial governments, was still influencing the judges. Moreover,
it is apparent that they feared that, if they interpreted s. 35(1) as
absolutely protecting Aboriginal and treaty rights, this would
create a legal vacuum, which would violate the rule of law as the
Court understood it. Just as "government" does not include
Aboriginal government, "law" does not include Aboriginal law. I
think that this judicial mindset is behind the Court's conclusion
that Aboriginal rights can still be infringed by federal legislation,
as nothing in the actual words of s. 35(1) leads to this result.
Support for my appraisal of the Court's approach to s. 35(1) in
Sparrow can be found by comparing it with the way the Court
assessed another constitutional provision guaranteeing Aboriginal
and treaty rights, namely a provision in the Natural Resources
Transfer Agreements.121 These agreements transferred most public
lands and resources in Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta to the
Crown in right of those provinces in 1930, placing them in a
position equal to that of the other Canadian provinces, which had
retained their lands and resources when they entered Confederation."' In order to provide limited protection to Aboriginal and
treaty rights to hunt, trap, and fish for food, the following
provision, which I refer to as the game laws paragraph, was
included in the agreements:
In order to secure to the Indians of the Province the continuance of the supply of
game and fish for their support and subsistence, Canada agrees that the laws
respecting game in force in the Province from time to time shall apply to the
Indians within the boundaries thereof, provided, however, that the said Indians
shall have the right, which the Province hereby assures to them, of hunting,
trapping and fishing game and fish for food at all seasons of the year on all

121. These agreements were implemented by federal and provincial legislation in
the three prairie provinces, as well as by Imperial legislation. The Imperial
legislation, the British North America Act, 1930, 20 & 21 Geo. V, c. 26 (U.K.),

which is now the Constitution Act, 1930 gave these agreements constitutional
status, as the Schedule to the Constitution Act, 1982 confirms.
122. This is due to s. 109 of the Constitution Act, 1867.
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unoccupied Crown lands and on any other lands to which the said Indians may
have a right of access.2

The game laws paragraph has been interpreted and applied in
numerous Supreme Court of Canada decisions.124 Those decisions have held that, so long as the Indians in question are

hunting, trapping, or fishing for food on the lands referred to,
they are not subject to provincial game laws. 2 ' The Court has
always treated the constitutional protection provided by the
paragraph as an absolute guarantee, without concerning itself with
the impact that might have on conservation.' 26 In light of the

123. Constitution Act, 1930, Schedule (1), Manitoba, Para. 13; Schedule (2),
Alberta, Para. 12; Schedule (3), Saskatchewan, Para. 12.
124. See e.g.: Prince and Myron v. R., [1964] S.C.R. 81 [hereinafter Prince];
Cardinalv. Alberta (A.G.), [1974] S.C.R. 695; Myran v. R., [1976] 2 S.C.R. 137;
Frank v. R., [1978] 1 S.C.R. 95; McKinney v. Canada, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 401; R. v.
Mousseau, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 89; R. v. Sutherland, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 451 [hereinafter
Sutherland];Moosehunter v. R. (1978), 43 C.C.C. (2d) 15 (Sask. C.A.), rev'd on other
grounds [1981] 1 S.C.R. 282 [hereinafterMoosehunter];R. v. Horse, [1988] 1 S.C.R.
187; Horseman, supra note 110.
125. For detailed discussion, see McNeil, supra note 23 at 20-45.
126. In Sutherland,supra note 124, the Supreme Court applied the Saskatchewan
Court of Appeal decision in R. v. Strongquill, (1953) 8 W.W.R. (N.S.) 247
[hereinafter Strongquill], where Gordon J.A. said at 260, in the context of the game
laws paragraph, that "Indians should be preserved before moose." Dehumanizing
as that statement may be, it nonetheless reveals that the Court of Appeal thought
that the Indian right to hunt for food took precedence over conservation. Also, in
Prince, supra note 124, the Supreme Court disregarded the conservation concerns
expressed by the majority in the Manitoba Court of Appeal, (1962) 40 W.W.R.
234, and decided that provincial game laws restricting methods of hunting do not
apply to Indians who are hunting for food. In so doing, the Court agreed with the
reasons of Freedman J.A., who wrote in his dissenting judgment at 243:
That indiscriminate resort to unsportsmanlike methods [in this case, use of
night lights] of hunting and fishing would be prejudicial to the supply of game
and fish is no doubt true. The answer, however, lies in the education of the
Indian so he will appreciate that what is in the best interests of the citizenry of
Manitoba is also in his own best interests. The answer does not consist in
construing the section contrary to what appears to me to be its plain and
dominant purpose.
(The lack of appreciation in this passage of Aboriginal values of conservation is
worth noting.) Compare Horseman, supra note 110, where Cory J., in his majority
judgment, did use conservation as a reason for concluding that the paragraph does
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Sparrow decision, this may appear surprising. However, I think the
explanation for this apparent discrepancy lies in the fact that the
courts have found other means to avoid whatever negative impact
the game laws paragraph might have on conservation. First, courts
have decided that Crown lands which have been set aside by a
province bona fide as game preserves are occupied, and therefore
are not available for Indian hunting, trapping, or fishing, unless
there is a right of accesss for those purposes."' However, game
preserves might not be adequate for conservation in some
instances, particularly if a species, such as the whooping crane, is
in danger of extinction. Without explicitly addressing this issue,
the Supreme Court has nonetheless dealt with it by deciding that
the game laws paragraph does not protect Indian hunting, trapping, and fishing against federal legislation.128 As Parliament
probably has broad jurisdiction to regulate these Aboriginal
activities under s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867,129 this

means that federal legislation can always be enacted if necessary for
conservation.13 In other words, the Court interpreted the game
laws paragraph in a way that maintained parliamentary sover-

not provide constitutional protection for commercial hunting. However, Cory J.
based that conclusion on his interpretation of the words "for food" in the
paragraph. In no case has the Court said that conservation needs would override
the protection which the paragraph provides for Indian subsistence hunting.
127. R. v. Smith, [1935] 2 W.W.R. 433 (Sask. C.A.); Strongquill, supra note 126;
R. v. Kootenay and Two Youngmen (1978), 6 Alta. L.R. (2d) 220 (Alta. Prov. Ct.),
aff'd (1979), 10 Alta. L.R. (2d) 15 (Alta. D.C.); Moosehunter, supra note 124; R. v.
Ross (1985), 47 Sask. R. 317 (Sask. C.A.); R. v. Wolverine and Bernard (1989), 74
Sask. R. 224 (Sask. C.A.): see discussion in McNeil, supra note 23 at 34-36.
However, provincial legislation which designates certain lands, including wildlife
management areas, as occupied for the purposes of the game laws paragraph is
constitutionally invalid: Sutherland, supra note 124.
128. See Daniels, supra note 21; Elk v. R., [1980] 2 S.C.R. 166.
129. See McNeil, supra note 23 at 12-17. Of course this is now subject to s. 35(1)
of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, and the justificatory test in Sparrow.
130. See R. v. Wesley, [1932] 2 W.W.R. 337 (Alta. C.A.) at 341, where
LunneyJ.A., said that "[i]f it should be necessary or desirable to curtail the
hunting rights of the Indian, provision has been made to that effect" (by s. 69 of
the Indian Act, R.S.C. 1927, c. 28, which empowered the federal Minister of the
Interior to declare that the game laws in any of the prairie provinces should apply
to the Indians therein).
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eignty, and its own vision of the rule of law, over Aboriginal
hunting, trapping, and fishing in the prairie provinces."'
Nor has the Supreme Court given conservation priority over
Aboriginal hunting rights when considering the effect of s. 88 of
the Indian Act"' which, with certain exceptions, subjects Indians
to provincial laws of general application. 33 On the contrary, in
his unanimous judgment in Kruger, Dickson J. said that if it could
be shown that
the Province has acted in such a way as to oppose conservation and Indian claims
to the detriment of the latter - to 'preserve moose before Indians' in the words
of Gordon J.A. in R. v. Strongquill - it might very well be concluded that the
effect of the legislation is to cross the line demarking laws of general application
from other enactments."'

Just before making this obiter statement, Dickson J. remarked:
Game conservation laws have as their policy the maintenance of wildlife resources.
It might be argued that without some conservation measures the ability of Indians
or others to hunt for food would become a moot issue in consequence of the
destruction of the resource. 35

While Dickson J. appears to want to have it both ways in these
contrasting passages, the dilemma is resolved by a statement he
made in the preceding paragraph:

131. The Court did not give this explanation of its interpretation of the paragraph in either of the decisions referred to, supra note 128. Instead, it relied mainly
on textual analysis. The fact remains that the result of those decisions is consistent
with preserving parliamentary sovereignty and the view of the rule of law to which
the Court gave precedence in the Manitoba Language Rights case.
132. Supra note 86.
133. The constitutionality of this provision is now open to question, due to
s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982: see Slattery, "First Nations and the
Constitution," supra note 2 at 285-286.
134. Kruger, supra note 23 at 112.
135. Ibid., quoted in Sparrow, supra note 12 at 1114.
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However abundant the right of Indians to hunt and to fish, there can be no doubt
that such right is subject to regulation and curtailment by the appropriate

legislative authority. "6

In situations where a province was constitutionally prevented from
"oppos[ing] conservation and Indian claims to the detriment of the
latter," the "appropriate legislative authority" Dickson J. had in
mind was obviously the Parliament of Canada. So as in the case of
the Natural Resources Transfer Agreements, parliamentary
sovereignty in the interest of conservation is maintained over
Indian hunting and fishing.13
Kruger and Manuel should be compared with the judgments in
Jack v. The Queen,13 decided by the Supreme Court two years
later. The appellants in that case, who were status Indians under
the Indian Act, 139 argued that provisions of the federal Fisheries
Act 140 prohibiting salmon fishing in certain rivers during
specified periods did not apply to them when they were fishing for
food. In their view, article 13 of the Terms of Union of British
Columbia with Canada protected their Aboriginal food fishery
from federal legislation, as Canada was constitutionally obliged by
that article to continue a policy "as liberal as that hitherto pursued
'
by the British Columbia Government."141
Chief Justice Laskin
dismissed this argument in the following terms:
I see nothing in art. 13 that could possibly operate as an inhibition on federal
legislative power in relation to fisheries. Whatever policy may have existed in preConfederation British Columbia of toleration of Indians fishing for food ... there
does not appear to have been any basis in law to ordain the policy. Nor can any
legal sanction for such Indian fishing rights be spelled out of art. 13."1

136. Ibid., note 23 at 111-112 (of course this was prior to the enactment of s. 35(1)
of the Constitution Act, 1982).
137. See also George, supra note 21.
138. [1980] 1 S.C.R. 294 [hereinafter Jack].
139. R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6.
140. Supra note 19.
141. British Columbia Terms of Union, R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 10, at 7.
142. Jack, supra note 138 at 299.
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Regarding a point made by the respondent about conservation,
Laskin C.J. observed that the appellants' counsel "conceded that
the prohibitory order, if made for conservation purposes, would
govern any Indian fishing rights."'43 He said he was inclined to
the view that the prohibition served a conservation purpose, from
which he concluded: "Hence, even if the fishing rights claimed
were established, they would have been properly subordinated to
'
conservation of the fisheries in the particular rivers." 144
Dickson J., in a separate judgment concurring in the result,
disagreed with the majority view that article 13 did not place any
restrictions on Canada's authority to regulate the Indian fishery.
In his view, "[t]he reference to 'policy' in art. 13 establishes a
limitation upon the federal legislative power in relation to the
Indian fishery and sets up a standard against which that federal legislation is to be tested."'45 However, Dickson J. said the words
"a policy as liberal" allow for flexibility, and require the Court
to balance the pre-Confederation policy with the current measures. In assessing the
liberality of the post-Confederation policy, it is necessary to take into account both
the emergence of conservation as a limitation by reason of declining fish stocks and
the development of a commercial and sports fishery after 1871.146

Dickson J. would have given Indian food fishing, and to a lesser
extent Indian commercial fishing, priority over non-Indian
commercial and sports fishing. However, for him conservation
came first:
[A]ny limitation upon Indian fishing that is established for a valid conservation
purpose overrides the protection afforded the Indian fishery by art. 13, just as such
conservation measures override other taking of fish. 4 '

143. Ibid. at 300.
144. Ibid.
145. Ibid. at 312.
146. Ibid. at 312-313.
147. Ibid. at 313. Dickson J.'s judgment in Jack obviously had a strong influence
on the decision which he and La Forest J. delivered in Sparrow: see supra note 12
at 1115-1116.
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On the facts, he found that the closure of certain rivers to salmon
fishing "was reasonable and necessary for the purpose of
conservation and [did] not offend against the priority assured to
'
the Indian fishery by reason of art. 13 of the Terms of Union."148
Chief Justice Laskin and Dickson J. therefore agreed that, if
article 13 placed constitutional restrictions on federal legislative
powers relating to Indian fishing, federal regulations for valid
conservation purposes would nonetheless override the protection
which article 13 provided. As in Sparrow, the Supreme Court was
therefore unwilling to allow a constitutional provision to impinge
on parliamentary sovereignty where the valid legislative objective
of conservation was concerned.
Our brief examination of the Natural Resources Transfer
Agreements and s. 88 of the Indian Act revealed that the Supreme
Court did not take conservation into account when constitutional
restrictions on provincial legislative powers over Aboriginal
hunting and fishing were involved. However, when constitutional
restrictions on federal legislative powers were suggested in the
context of the British Columbia Terms of Union, the Court was
willing to use conservation to limit the scope of the alleged
restrictions. In my view, the reason courts treat these situations
differently is that, if necessary for conservation, the federal
government could enact legislation to regulate Aboriginal hunting
and fishing which the provinces were unable to regulate, 49 but
conversely the provinces could not conversely legislate to replace
federal laws that were found unconstitutional in the same
context.1 50 In each of these situations, the Supreme Court has
maintained its own vision of parliamentary sovereignty and the
rule of law by preserving federal legislative power. Subject to the
justificatory test, it did the same thing in Sparrow, despite the fact

148. Jack, supra note 138 at 315.
149. As we have seen, Parliament's jurisdiction over these activities probably
comes from s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867: see supra note 129 and text.
150. The fact that the Supreme Court differentiated between provincial and
federal powers in this way where earlier constitutional protections of Aboriginal
rights were concerned supports the argument that, in the context of s. 35(1),
provincial laws which infringe Aboriginal or treaty rights cannot be justified by
the Sparrow test: see supra note 23.
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that s. 35(1) provided the Court with an opportunity to envisage
a protected constitutional space within which Aboriginal
governments could flourish and grow.

III. A Constitutional Space for Self-Government
Our discussion so far suggests that, despite s. 35(1), the Supreme
Court of Canada is still operating within a colonial paradigm of
constitutional law insofar as the rights of the Aboriginal peoples
are concerned. In Sparrow, the Court reaffirmed the standard
colonial view that "there was from the outset never any doubt that
sovereignty and legislative power, and indeed the underlying title,
to [Aboriginal] lands vested in the Crown."'51 Moreover, the
colonial paradigm does not envisage an alternative to this denial of
Aboriginal sovereignty, as the complementary principles of
parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of (Euro-Canadian) law
exclude Aboriginal governments and laws from their legitimate
place within the Canadian Constitution.
By proposing recognition of the inherent Aboriginal right of
self-government in the Constitution, the Charlottetown Accord
might have sounded the death knoll for the colonial paradigm in
Canadian constitutional thought. However, with the defeat of the
Accord by the electorate, that opportunity to recognize the right
explicitly has been lost, at least for the time being. So, within the
context of the Canadian Constitution, the Aboriginal peoples are
left with s. 35(1), as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Sparrow.
There may nonetheless be a way to use that decision for the
promotion of self-government. The key is to meet the Court's
unarticulated, but evident, concern that a jurisdictional and legal
vacuum would result if federal authority over Aboriginal and
treaty rights was excluded by s. 35(1).
To do this, one first needs to redefine the British conceptions of
parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law in ways that are

151. Sparrow, supra note 12 at 1103. For critical comment, see Asch and
Macklem, supra note 28.
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appropriate for Canada. Canadian definitions of these concepts
must take into account not only our federal system and the
CharterofRights and Freedoms, but also the presence of Aboriginal
peoples with governments and laws which have as much claim to
legitimacy as the federal and provincial governments and laws. In
Canada, parliamentary sovereignty therefore has to be redefined so
that legislative jurisdiction is divided among the federal, provincial,
and Aboriginal governments. The rule of law must also be
redefined to include Aboriginal laws, as well as the common law
and federal and provincial legislation. To cling to the old notions
of parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law is to perpetuate
outdated and unacceptable colonial attitudes.
For these new definitions to be meaningful, s. 35(1) has to be
interpreted as creating a constitutional space for Aboriginal
governments and laws. The jurisdiction these governments can
exercise within that space would extend to all components of the
Aboriginal and treaty rights that the section recognizes and
affirms, which, as we have seen, probably include all aspects of
Aboriginal life. What the Aboriginal peoples have to do if they
want to exercise their jurisdiction is to fill this constitutional space
with Aboriginal laws. To the extent that these laws, whether
customary or legislative in nature, are already in place, the task is
simply to act on them and demonstrate their existence. Where
they are not in place, Aboriginal peoples have the option of
making them by exercising their inherent right of selfgovernment.'
Failing that, however, federal laws infringing
their Aboriginal and treaty rights which meet the justificatory test
will continue to apply to them due to the decision in Sparrow.
To the extent that Aboriginal and treaty rights are adequately
regulated by Aboriginal laws, federal laws infringing those rights

152. Because this right is inherent, stemming from the fact that Aboriginal
peoples were self-governing nations prior to the colonization of Canada by Europeans, it does not have to be recognized by the Canadian Constitution. All that is
necessary for it to flourish and grow is to provide a constitutional space where that
can happen, which, on the argument presented here, is what s. 35(1) has done.
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cannot apply to them. 53 This conclusion flows from the Sparrow
decision. As we have seen, before federal laws are allowed to
infringe Aboriginal and treaty rights, the Supreme Court said a
valid legislative objective must exist. Moreover, that objective has
to be pursued in a manner which infringes those rights as little as
possible. But if an Aboriginal people is already regulating its own
rights in a way which is consistent with the legislative objective,
there can be no need, and therefore no justification, for the federal
laws to apply.'
In the context of the fishing rights which were in question in
Sparrow, for example, if the Musqueam had shown that they had
laws which adequately regulated the fishing activities of the
members of their Nation, there would be no reason for the federal
fishery regulations to apply to them."'5 In those circumstances,
an attempt by the federal government to try to justify the.
application of its own regulations would probably fail. The
government might nonetheless attempt to show that, however
adequately the Musqueam were regulating their fishing, management of the resource as a whole required a comprehensive
regulatory scheme, with priority given to Aboriginal users. But
even if that were so, it would not necessarily mean that the
Sparrow test of justification had been met so that the federal
regulations would displace those of the Musqueam Nation. The
Sparrow test, it should be recalled, can require consultation with
Aboriginal people before regulatory measures are applied to
them.'56 It is therefore suggested that, in this situation, the
federal government would be under an obligation to discuss its

153. A fortiori,provincial laws would not apply either, even if the Sparrow test
can be used to justify them in the absence of Aboriginal laws: see supra note 23.
154. For a variation on this approach, see Slattery "First Nations and the
Constitution", supra note 2, especially at 282-283.
155. The burden of proving Aboriginal laws appears to be on the people alleging
them, as common law courts do not initially take judicial notice of them. On

proof of Aboriginal customary laws, see: Angu v. Attah (1916), P.C. Gold Coast
1874-1928,43 at 44; EffuahAmissah v. Effuah Krabah (1936), 2 W.A.C.A. 30 (P.C.)
at 31; In Re Bed of Wanganui River, [1955] N.Z.L.R. 419 (C.A.) at 432.
156. Sparrow, supra note 12 at 1119. See also R. v. Bones, [1990] 4 C.N.L.R. 37
(B.C. Prov. Ct.) at 44.
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conservation plans with the Musqueam Nation, and try to arrive
at a negotiated solution. This cooperative approach could result in
a treaty, which each party would agree to implement. In this way,
the right of the Musqueam Nation to govern fishing by its
members would be respected, and at the same time the federal
government's objective of comprehensively regulating the fishery
would be met."'

Conclusion
Decolonization of the Canadian Constitutioninvolves envisaging
space for Aboriginal governments to exercise their inherent
powers, which can be done by interpreting s. 35(1) in an expansive
way. While avoiding the jurisdictional vacuum which the Supreme
Court apparently feared in Sparrow, this approach is consistent
with the justificatory test which the Court laid down in that case.
Moreover, it empowers the Aboriginal peoples to take charge of
their own communities at whatever pace they choose. Selfgovernment is neither withheld from nor forced upon them. Some
Aboriginal peoples might choose to exercise extensive selfgovernment powers immediately, while others might choose to
wait until they feel better prepared. The process could be a stepby-step one, permitting an Aboriginal people to gain confidence
and expertise in one area, before gradually extending its jurisdiction into other fields. This would allow for both stability and
growth. But most importantly of all, it would provide a way to
acknowledge immediately, without more constitutional haggling,
that Aboriginal governments have a rightful place in the Canadian
Constitution.

157. If a negotiated agreement could
regulations could be tested in court in
event, the good faith of each of the
important factor to consider. It would
to negotiate sincerely.

not be reached, the validity of the federal
accordance with the Sparrow test. In that
parties in the negotiations would be an
therefore be in the interest of both parties
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